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MooTNESS AND ATToRNEYS' FEES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT IN THE OLD TIMER, INC. V. BLA CKHA WK-
CENTRAL CITY SANITATION DISTRICT
WANDA A. DOTSON*
INTRODUCTION
By allowing citizens to enforce environmental laws under the
Clean Water Act, Congress has articulated its intent that "[c]itizen groups
are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as
welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests."'
The Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Distric? case
followed the trend in most circuit court cases that have welcomed
citizens into the pool of the environmental enforcement actors.3 The
Court held that the citizen-plaintiff may receive attorneys' fees if it shows
that its action was the "substantial factor leading to the relief obtained"
even though the violators had complied with the law and had paid a civil
penalty to the government.4
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.5 that a
citizen group could not receive attorneys' fees because the corporation
was now in compliance, making injunctive relief unnecessary. Further,
mootness principles, the Fourth Circuit contended, prompted the Court to
find that civil penalties are inappropriate as well since the polluters only
pay the government, while the citizens go uncompensated.6 Thus, civil
penalties could not redress any injury to the citizens, failing the third
prong of the Supreme Court's test for standing.7 In 1999, the United
States Supreme Court agreed to hear the Laidlaw case.
8
* J.D., 2001, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976).2The Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation District, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(D. Colo. 1999) [hereinafter The Old Timer].31d. at 1116. Cases cited in The Old Timer indicate that most courts follow the same
reasoning and allow plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees and to overcome mootness claims even
though injunctive relief is no longer available.4id. at 1119.
sFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir.
1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 167, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) [hereinafter Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw].
6Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Fourth Circuit's decision concerning attorneys' fees in citizen-plaintiffenvironmental actions.
71d. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Court did not address the other two
prongs, injury in fact and causation.
8Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. I I I I (1999). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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This Comment focuses on the 1999 decision, The Old Timer,
Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation District,9 in which the district
court did not agree with the Fourth Circuit in Laidlaw but followed other
circuit court rulings. This Comment analyzes two major issues from The
Old Timer: mootness and attorneys' fees. First, part I details the Clean
Water Act. Part H then presents the facts and procedural history in this
case. Part 1II explores the main issues of mootness and attorneys' fees.
Finally, part IV examines the relationship between The Old Timer and
existing case law, details Congressional intent of "prevailing party" in 33
U.S.C. § 1365 of the Clean Water Act, and ponders the impact of The
Old Timer.
I. CLEAN WATER ACT
A. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 Citizen Suits
In 1972, Congress "substantially overhauled the nation's system
of water pollution control"'1 by amending the Clean Water Act," l enacted
in 1948.12 This overhaul gave federal district courts jurisdiction to hear
private citizen suits.13 Previously, citizens used common law tort actions
such as negligence, trespass, and nuisance to fight environmental
pollution. 14 Yet these common law actions were individual claims later
requiring governmental regulations to effect broad change. 15
Once governmental regulations were in place, however, citizens
became upset with the government for not adequately enforcing these
laws or for not enacting more stringent laws.16 Thus, Congress amended
the Clean Water Act in 1972 "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's water.. .. "17 As part of
that goal, Congress authorized guidelines for the amount of pollutants
discharged into the water.' 8 These guidelines provide for a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, issued through
9The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109.
"Citizen's Action Under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(A)(I)for Violations of Effluent Standards
or Limitations under Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 § 1251 et seq.) or Orders with
Respect Thereto, 68 A.L.R. FED. 701, 704 (1984) [hereinafter Citizen's Action].
"Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376(1999) [hereinafter Clean
Water Act).
12Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. 92-500, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
3Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). See generally Citizen's Action, supra note 10.
1
4See Sharon Elliot, Citizen Suits under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot in the
Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REV. 175, 176 (1987).
"SSee id. at 176.
16See id.
l7Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
"8See Elliot, supra note 15, at 177.
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the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or a federally approved
state program.19 Under § 1365 Congress made citizens "an integral
component of the Act's enforcement scheme," 20 by allowing citizens to
enforce these permits. Section 1365(a)(1) reads in part:
(a)... any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or
agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator
or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation,
21
or ....
Furthermore, Congress gave federal district courts the power to
impose "any apropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this
title. ,22 Thus, Congress allowed citizens to seek civil penalties but not to
seek damages under the Clean Water Act.
B. Limitations on Citizen Suits
1. Notice
Under § 1365(b)(1)(A), Congress requires citizens to give sixty
days notice prior to filing a lawsuit.23 The citizen must give notice of the
alleged violation to federal and state governments, as well as to the
alleged violators.24 In 1989, the Supreme Court inHallstrom v. Tillamook
County held the sixty-day notice mandatory.25 In 1987, the Supreme Court
in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation had
reasoned that the "purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus
likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit."
26
19Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b).20Bruce Allen Morris, The Oregon Misstep and the Texas Two Step: Two Recent
Appellate Cases Expand CWA Citizen Suits, II NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 50 (1996).21Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(2) (emphasis added).
22Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
23Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
24
1d.
25Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989).
26Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
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2. Diligent Prosecution
The Gwaltney Court ruled that the role of the citizen suit is "to
supplement rather than to supplant governmental action."27 Thus, under
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), a citizen may not sue if the EPA or the state is
"diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court."28 In 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) Congress has limited lawsuits in cases in which the
state government "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action"
under state law that is comparable to the Clean Water Act's admifiistrative
penalty set forth in § 1319(g). Under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii),
Congress has limited lawsuits where the state has issued a final order and
"the violator has paid a penalty."
29
3. Prevailing Party Requirement
The Clean Water Act's § 1365(d) makes attorneys' fees
available only to a "prevailing or substantially prevailing party." In
1987 Congress added the "prevailing" or "substantially prevailing"
requirement while retaining the previous language, "whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate."3 Part IV(B) of this
Comment examines this language in detail.
II. THE OLD TIMER CASE
A. Facts
Defendant Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation District ("the
District") collected and treated wastewater from the towns of Blackhawk
and Central City, Colorado, and discharged the treated wastewater into
North Clear Creek.3' Plaintiff Robert L. Grisenti owned and operated
The Old Timer, Inc., which was located seven miles downstream from
the sewage treatment plant.32 The Old Timer was a tourist attraction
where people panned for gold in the North Clear Creek.33 Obviously, the
27
1d.
28Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B).29CIean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)4iii).
3033 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
31The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at I I 11.
32
1d.
33The Old Timer, Inc., Robert L. Grisenti and Rodney Cummings v. Blackhawk-Central
City Sanitation District, En-Tech, Inc. a/k/a Environmental Technicians, Inc., and Water Quality
Management Corp., Inc., No. 93-B-249, at 2-3 (D. Colo. filed Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinafter The Old
Timer Complaint]. According to the complaint filed in this civil action, Grisenti leases the land to
Cummings for operation of the tourist attraction during the summer.
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tourists had "physical contact with the river."34 Meanwhile, legalized
gambling caused the populations in the towns of Blackhawk and Central
City to grow; presumably, the increased demand inundated the sewage
treatment plant.
35
The District contracted with private industry to operate the
treatment plant under a state-issued NPDES permit.36 In July 1992 and
August 1992 the District violated its permit, notably during the The Old
Timer's peak season." Eventually, on September 8, 1992 the state health
department issued a Notice of Violation and Cease and Desist Order
(NOV/CDO) to the District for the July and August 1992 violations.38
On September 22, 1992, although The Old Timer notified the
District of its plan to sue, 39 it failed to notify the other defendants that it
planned to sue.40 The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), requires a
sixty-day notice.4 The Old Timer's notice referenced the state's
NOV/CDO.42 On January 29, 1993, The Old Timer and Grisenti filed
suit in United States District Court in Colorado.43
The Sanitation District then compiled a "three-part plan that
included immediate actions, interim improvements, and a large-scale
treatment plant expansion."44 Even so, on August 26, 1993, the EPA
issued a violation for offenses committed during the interim period.45
Ultimately, on September 19, 1995, the State approved an agreement
with the Sanitation District and imposed a $85,000 civil penalty.46
B. Procedural History
On June 17, 1999, Judge Carlos Lucero, a Tenth Circuit judge
sitting by designation, granted summary judgment to the three private
operators47 because The Old Timer had not notified these three
defendants within the sixty-day period.48 The Court denied The Old
U'The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at i 111.
35id.36
1d
37The Old Timer Complaint, No. 93-B-249 at 3.




4133 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).









"The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. See also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493
U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989).
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Timer's request for summary judgment and referred the case back to the
district judge for a determination on three issues.49
First, the district court must rule on the District's liability for
violations under the Clean Water Act after May 16, 1994,50 because the
State's final order covered injuries through that date; thus, res judicata
barred The Old Timer's action against the District through May 16,
1994.51 Second, the Court must determine the District's liability for The
Old Timer's pendent state law claims.52 Those claims included trespass,
nuisance, misrepresentation and concealment, as well as outrageous
conduct.5 3 Third, the District Court must determine whether The Old
Timer is entitled to attorneys' fees for the defendant's alleged violations
committed both before and after May 16, 1994.- 4
I. THE OLD TIMER OPINION: ISSUES OF MOOTNESS AND
ATrORNEYS' FEES
A. Mootness
As a rule, the principle of mootness is a primary question for any
court, derived from Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution. Clause 1 states that the judicial power shall extend to all
"cases or controversies."5 5 Hence, in the pollution context, the Gwaltney
Court ruled that "[l]ongstanding principles of mootness, however,
prevent the maintenance of suit when 'there is no reasonable expectation
that the wrong will be repeated.' 56 Thus a citizen must "make a good-
faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation," at the onset of
49The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. at 1120.
50Id.
311d. at 1117. The court concluded that although The Old Timer's "civil penalty action is
not precluded by either § 1319(g)(6)(A) or motness doctrine, some of its claims-those specifically
covered by the state's agency's final order-are nonetheless barred." Id. Judge Lucero ruled that a
"state and its private citizens are in privity when the state, acting as parens patriae, brings an action
for damage to a public resource." Thus, the state recovered penalties for July 1992 through May 16,
1994 violations. Id. at 1118.
21d. at 1120.
'3The Old Timer Complaint, No. 93-B-249 at 8-1I.
5'The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. Both parties prepared a stipulated order, and on
January 5, 2000, the district court judge granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. Both sides
agreed to pay their own costs and attorneys' fees. Telephone interview, Clerk, D. Colo. (Feb. 9,
2001).
55U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
-6Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,633
(1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (CA2 1945))). The
Court in Gwaltney examined the meaning of the words, "to be in violation," of§ 1365(a)(1) and
concluded that the "definition makes plain what the undeviating use of the present tense strongly
suggests: the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in
the past." Id. at 59.
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the lawsuit, thus squelching any mootness defense. Only then will the
district court have jurisdiction.
57
The primary issue in The Old Timer was whether the District's
large-scale improvements mooted the controversy since the District had
complied with its permit.58 The judge concluded that The Old Timer's
"claim for injunctive relief is moot because" the District complied with
its permit and "its permanent improvements make it unlikely that the
discharge violations at issue in this case will continue.
'" 59
Nevertheless, Judge Lucero ruled that the District's compliance
does not moot The Old Timer's claim for civil penalties. 6° Using seven
federal court decisions as support, 61 the Judge determined that "even if a
polluter's post-complaint compliance moots a citizen's claim for
injunctive relief, the citizen's claim for civil penalties is not moot. "
62
Next, Judge Lucero noted two contrary court opinions, Laidlaw63 and the
1998 Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture decision.
64
Those courts held that once a "citizen's claim for injunctive or
declaratory relief became moot, the citizen's claim for civil penalties was
also rendered moot."
65
Judge Lucero further explained that these two cases, Laidlaw
and Dubois, rely on the Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment.66 In that case, the Supreme Court
determined that the citizen-plaintiff lacked standing. 67 Moreover, the
Court concluded that a penalty paid to the United States Treasury would
not redress an injury to the plaintiff but only redress its "'undifferentiated
"See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
58
See The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
59
1d. at 1116.
6"See id. at 1 116.
61
id. (citing Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 356 (8th
Cir. 1998); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814,820 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 442 (1997); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref.
& Mktg. Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 (3d Cir. 1993); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am.
Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2d Cir. 1993); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus. Inc., 931 F.2d 1055,
1065 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128,
1135 (11 th Cir. 1990); Paxtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089,1094 (1 st
Cir. 1986)).62
The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
63
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
64
Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 20 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (D.N.H. 1998)
(holding that a claim for civil penalties became moot when claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief became moot, reasoning that penalties to the United States Treasury could not redress
citizen's injury).65 The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
66d. at 1117. See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).67
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
public interest' in faithful execution of [federal law]. "68 Thus, the claims
were moot because the plaintiffs now lacked standing.
Unlike the alleged injury in Steel, The Old Timer's injuries are
direct in that the alleged violations are ongoing and hurt the tourist
attraction's reputation and business. 69 Thus, Judge Lucero believed that
the District's "future compliance with its permit and fining the polluter
for its recent violations may well alleviate the concerns of potential




Section 1365(d) of the Clean Water Act makes attorneys' fees
available only to a "prevailing or substantially prevailing party.'1 Judge
Lucero in The Old Timer referred the issue of attorneys' fees to the
district judge to determine if the company was in fact a "prevailing
party."72 The district judge must determine if The Old Timer "was a
substantialfactor motivating the [state's] enforcement proceeding or the
District's act of bringing itself into compliance and settling the penalty
proceeding."7 3 Thus, it is a fact question for the judge.
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Laidlaw concluded that the environmental groups were not entitled to $2
million dollars in litigation fees 74 because they were not prevailing
parties since the controversy was now moot.75 They appealed, and the




The Old Timer correctly followed the majority of cases that have
addressed the issues of mootness and attorneys' fees under the Clean
Water Act. The next section of this Comment considers The Old Timer's
6Id. at 1018 (citing and quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577
(1992)).
69The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
701d. See also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1987) (noting that the purpose
of CWA civil penalties is 'retribution," "deterrence* and 'restitution').
733 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
7The Old Timer, 51 F.Supp. 2d at 1120 (emphasis added).73
1d.
71Seth Borenstein, Pollution Suits Face Hurdle in High Court, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, October 9, 1999, at A3.
75Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 307 n.5.
76Borenstein, supra note 75, at A3.
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relationship to existing case law, contemplates the intent of "prevailing
party" and ponders the possible impact of The Old Timer.
A. The Old Timer's Relationship to Existing Case Law
The Supreme Court's prior decisions and a dozen circuit court
decisions demanded that the court in The Old Timer rule as it did on the
mootness and attorneys' fees issues. For example, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in its 1998 Comfort Lake Association, Inc. v.
Dresel Contracting Inc. 77 decision that "even if a polluter's voluntary
permanent cessation of the alleged violations moots a citizen suit claim
for injunctive relief, it does not moot a related claim for civil penalties."
78
Regarding attorneys' fees, the judge in The Old Timer relied on
the Supreme Court's "catalyst test" from the 1987 decision, Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.79 The "catalyst test"
states that "if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict is
issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation
expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions."80
The Laidlaw court, however, relied on the 1992 Supreme Court
case, Farrar v. Hobby.8' In that case, the Court determined that "to
qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least
some relief on the merits of his claim."82 The Farrar holding is much
different than the catalyst test. Incidentally, the Farrar decision was not
a Clean Water Act case nor was it a case in which mootness was an
issue. Nonetheless, the Laidlaw court believed that the Gwaltney
decision allowing litigation costs under § 1365(d)83 (the "catalyst test")
was no longer applicable because Congress had passed amendments in
1987 to § 1365(d).14 At any rate, the Laidlaw court used Farrar to
preclude the plaintiffs from receiving attorneys' fees.
8 5
77Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting Inc., 138 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1998).
781d. at 356. See also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116
F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 918 (1997); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 (3d Cir. 1993); Atlantic States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2d Cir. 1993); Carr v. Alta Verde
Indus. Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1065 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11 th Cir. 1990); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986).
79Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 49.
gold. at 67 n.6 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499).
81Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
21d. at I 11.83In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court stated that award of costs *should extend to plaintiffs
in actions which result in successful abatement but do not reach a verdict." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at
67 n.6 (1987).
"Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306 n.5.
851d.
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There are at least ten circuit court decisions that have followed
the reasoning in The Old Timer regarding the "substantial factor" or
"catalyst test" from Gwaltney.86 In 1994, for example, in Baumgartner v.
Harrisburg Housing Authority,87 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, "[w]e believe it is not likely that the Supreme Court [in Farrar]
would overturn such a wide-spread theory without even once mentioning
it, particularly when it was inapplicable to the case at hand."88 Also, the
environmental groups in Laidlaw think it is odd that the Farrar Court
overruled the catalyst test "without expressly indicating that it was doing
so. "89 Therefore, it is logical for courts to believe that the "catalyst test"
abounds today.
B. Intent of "Prevailing Party"
In 1987 Congress amended § 1365(d) by adding the "prevailing"
or "substantially prevailing" requirement while retaining, "whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate." 90 Prior to the amendments,
courts were reading the "appropriate" language to allow "a court to award
fees even to a non-prevailing environmental suit plaintiff, so long as the
lawsuit had other salutary effects, such as clarifying the law, ensuring
representation of environmental interests before the court, or focusing
attention on important environmental issues."9' The legislative history of
the 1987 amendment "shows that the change in the language ... was
intended merely to clarify Congress' intent that citizen plaintiffs not
receive attorneys' fee awards when the plaintiffs had lost the litigation.
92
86See Brief for Petitioners, 1999 WL 311764, at *48; Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149
F.3d 303 (1999) (citing Maduka v. Meissner, 114 F.3d 1240, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Marbley v.
Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir.
1995); Zinn by Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274-276 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31
F.3d 942, 951-952 (10th Cir. 1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 547
(3d Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1, 17 F.3d 260, 262-
263 (8th Cir. 1994); American Council of the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250-251 (10th Cir.
1993); Craig v. Gregg County, Texas, 988 F.2d 18,20-21 (5th Cir. 1993); Paris v. HUD, 988 F.2d
236,240-241 (1st Cir. 1993); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City Sch., 985 F.2d 255,
257-258 (6th Cir. 1993)).
87Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 1994).
8ld. at 547. See also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d
124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling that "[w]e believe that when the polluter's settlement with state
authorities follows the proper commencement of a citizen suit, one can, absent contrary evidence,
infer that the existence of the citizen suit was a motive for the polluter's settlement and that the
citizen suit plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party.').
89Brief for Petitioners, 1999 WL 311764, at *46 n.27, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,
149 F.3d 303 (1999) (quoting Zinn by Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (1994)).
9033 U.S.C. § 1365(d). See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney's Fees
Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 781 (1993).
9 1Sisk, supra note 91, at 778.92Brief for Petitioners, 1999 WL 311764, at *46 n.27, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,
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Thus, Congress did not eliminate the "catalyst test." It merely reeled in
courts that were awarding attorneys' fees to non-prevailing parties.
In Farrar, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court ruled that "to
qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least
some relief on the merits of his claim."93 The Farrar Court concluded
that the plaintiff could be a prevailing party if the court awarded nominal
damages in the 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action.94 The Court stated, "[a]
judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal,
modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiff s benefit by forcing the
defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay."
95
The Court in Farrar stated that "comparable relief through a consent
decree or settlement" is "some relief on the merits."
96
The environmental groups in Laidlaw point out that prior to
Farrar it was settled law "that a plaintiff has prevailed for purposes of
fees when, in the absence of a court order or a settlement, a voluntary
change in the defendant's conduct as a result of a lawsuit has redressed
the plaintiff's grievances."9 7 In other words, a plaintiff may prevail even
without winning a court order or settlement.
The Old Timer court defined "prevailing party" as a citizen-
plaintiff who was the "substantial factor leading to the relief obtained."98
In The Old Timer, the defendant District entered an agreement with state
regulators after The Old Timer filed suit,99 and in Laidlaw, the court
found that the state regulators had not diligently prosecuted the company
to force compliance.1°° Thus, the parties modified or changed their
conduct and in doing so, the plaintiffs were "prevailing parties."
Of course, there are limits. Jan Amundson, attorney for the
National Association of Manufacturers, has said, "We would hope it [the
Laidlaw decision] would be discouraging of frivolous litigation."' 01 The
facts in The Old Timer indicate that its lawsuit was not frivolous. Judge
149 F.3d 303 (1999) (citing S. REP. No. 233, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 24-25 (1983); LGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Print 144 (Nov.
1988), vol. 2, pp. 1311-1312 (remarks of Senator Chafee, the sponsor of the legislation)).
3 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992).
"Id. The Court in Farrar reasoned that fees must be reasonable and that "because of his
failure to prove an essential element of this claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is
usually no fee at all." Id. at 115.
"Id.
961d. at I ll.
97Brief for Petitioners, 1999 WL311764, at * 46, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149
F.3d 303 (1999)
"The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
"Id. at 1112.
'"°Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305.
"o'Borenstein, supra note 75, at A3 (quoting Amundson who filed a brief supporting
Laidlaw).
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Lucero noted that "there is at least some evidence in the record that The
Old Timer's conduct motivated both the [state] to enforce the law strictly
and the District to make the improvements and settle the penalty
proceeding."0 2 The facts of Laidlaw also suggest that the ongoing
violations prompted the environmental groups to seek judicial relief
under the Clean Water Act.
10 3
C. The Impact of The Old Timer
The impact of The Old Timer hinges, in part, on the Supreme
Court. If the Supreme Court affirms the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Laidlaw, the Court will surely frustrate the purpose that Congress
envisioned from the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.1 4
Congress believed that citizens would instigate lawsuits to abate or halt
pollution. 0 5 Otherwise, the desired outcome from these lawsuits, polluter
compliance and abatement of pollution, has the undesirable effect of
mooting the lawsuit and precluding attorneys' fees. That outcome would
be devastating to citizens and to the long-reaching impact of The Old
Timer.
Admittedly, The Old Timer, as a private corporation, may have
resources to pay for legal help to ensure clean water at its tourist
attraction. Yet, nonprofit organizations such as Friends of the Earth may
not have those resources.'0 6 Consequently, these groups cannot afford
attorneys to fight the alleged polluters. 0 7 By allowing citizens to enforce
the Clean Water Act, Congress intended for citizens to participate when
the government had not and for courts to award attorneys' fees when
appropriate. Thus, the "catalyst test" in The Old Timer is the correct test
for determining a "prevailing party" award and fulfills Congress' mandate
to welcome citizens into the environmental enforcement arena. Judge
Lucero was right. If citizens prod the government into action, then they
deserve reasonable attorneys' fees for their efforts.
David Lewis, executive director of Save The Bay, has said that a
1
t 2The Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d at I119.
'°3Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305.
104See Amicus Brief for the Public Citizen and the American Civil Liberties Union, 1999
WL 311755, at *8, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S.Ct.
693 (2000).
'0°Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61 (citing legislative history from the 1972 amendments).
10 6Borenstein, supra note 75, at A3 (quoting David Lewis, executive director of Save The
Bay, "All you have to do is look at my budget to see that we're not getting fat off of these
lawsuits.').
0 7See Amicus Brief for Public Citizen and the American Civil Liberties Union, 1999 WL
311755, at * 19, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), revd, 120 S.Ct. 693
(2000).
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citizens' suit's purpose is "to make sure that environmental pollution laws
are enforced." 10 8 Indeed that is what we all hope. The laws, enforced
either by government or citizens, help ensure clean water for everyone,
even tourists panning for gold in the North Clear Creek.
The United States Supreme Court ruled on January 12, 2000 in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, (TO),
Inc. 109 that the environmental groups' claims for civil penalties were not
moot even though the defendant had come into compliance." 0 The Court
concluded that "[i]t would be premature, however, for us to address the
continuing validity of the catalyst theory in the context of this case.""'
The issue of attorneys' fee was left to the federal district court to
address. 12 Nevertheless, the Court noted that several Court of Appeals
had determined that Farrar did not "repudiate the catalyst theory."' 13
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the 'catalyst theory" is an inappropriate test for determining a "prevailing
party."' 1 4 The Court held:
Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award
attorney's fees and costs to the "prevailing party." The
question presented is whether this term includes a party
that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a
court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless
achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought
about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.
We hold that it does not.' 5
The Buckhannon decision involved the interpretation of
"prevailing party" in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the
American with Disabilities Act of 1990.116
Federal courts that want to award attorneys' fees in cases such as
The Old Timer may find that the cases are not moot as the Supreme
Court did in Laidlaw and award attorneys' fees anyway.
0 8Borenstein, supra note 75, at A3 (quoting Lewis).





S"Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001).
"'Id. at 1838.
1161d.
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